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 In the highly charged political process of vetting, presenting, and 
approving federal judicial nominees, it is commonplace for Presi-
dents, Senators, and interest groups to make claims about a nomi-
nee’s merit or lack thereof. Both supporters and opponents of nomi-
nees often phrase their positions in objective terms of merit. 
 Independent groups such as the American Bar Association (ABA) 
also appeal to seemingly objective terms of merit in evaluating judi-
cial candidates. The ABA’s ratings of judicial appointees are specifi-
cally phrased in terms of the nominee’s professional qualifications, 
and in recent years the objectivity of these ratings has frequently 
been the subject of controversy. In the recent dispute over the nomi-
nation of California Supreme Court Justice Janice Rogers Brown to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for example, no one 
on the fifteen-member ABA evaluation committee rated Brown “well 
qualified,” a majority rated her merely “qualified,” while some mem-
bers of the committee rated her “not qualified.” This resulted in the 
ABA committee releasing an oxymoronic rating of “qualified/not 
qualified.”1 Of course, the rhetoric over judicial qualifications is most 
impassioned in the debate over selecting U.S. Supreme Court Jus-
tices. After two members of the ABA evaluation committee rated 
Clarence Thomas “not qualified” to be appointed to the Supreme 
Court, President Bush proposed ending the organization’s fifty-year 
role in the judicial appointments process,2 thus eliminating even the 
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 2. Neil A. Lewis & David Johnston, Bush Would Sever Law Group’s Role in Screen-
ing Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2001, at A1. 
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pretense that an objective assessment of judicial quality was possi-
ble. 
 Claims concerning judicial nominees’ professional qualifications, 
however, are rarely gauged against empirical evidence which might 
support or contradict them. In recent years, extensive data on the ju-
diciary and individual judges has become widely available to political 
scientists, economists, and legal scholars, presenting a fertile oppor-
tunity for the empirical study of courts and judges. Today, the out-
comes of the judicial process—judicial opinions—are widely available 
in searchable form through electronic databases, including Westlaw 
and LEXIS. More extensive common datasets for many court systems 
are also available to researchers.3  
 If you build a squash court, it does not take long for a player to 
find it. Indeed, given the rich availability of data, in recent years, 
empirical studies of judicial institutions4 and judicial behavior5 have 
proliferated. So have studies of judges.6 One of the more provocative 
recent studies of judicial behavior, by Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati, 
builds on the rich availability of data on the performance of individ-
ual judges.7 Their judicial tournament, which purports to introduce 
calm objectivity into the study of judicial performance and judicial 
selection, has generated a furor of sorts. Choi and Gulati argue that 
                                                                                                                     
 3. In 2000, Judicature, the official journal of the American Judicature Society, de-
voted several articles to the topic of the use of data on courts to understand the judicial 
process. The issue surveyed the emergence of a broad range of common datasets, covering 
a diverse range of courts including the U.S. Supreme Court, federal appellate courts, and 
many state courts. See Symposium, Social Science, the Courts, and the Law, 83 
JUDICATURE 217 (2000). 
 4. F. Andrew Hanssen, The Effect of Judicial Institutions on Uncertainty and the 
Rate of Litigation: The Election Versus Appointment of State Judges, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 
205 (1999); Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Politics: The Political Economy of 
Tort Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157 (1999). 
 5. See Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial 
Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1995); Frank B. Cross, Decision-
making in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1457 (2003); Theodore 
Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards 
Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151 (1991); Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of 
Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635 (1998); Deborah Jones 
Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United 
States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71 (2001); Richard L. Revesz, Congressional In-
fluence on Judicial Behavior? An Empirical Examination of Challenges to Agency Action in 
the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100 (2001); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regula-
tion, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997); Gregory C. Sisk et al., 
Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998). 
 6. See Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Conse-
quences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903 (2003); Wil-
liam M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals 
Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1998). 
 7. Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299 (2004) 
(raising the idea of a judicial tournament).  
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the selection of Justices for the U.S. Supreme Court ought to be 
based on a tournament, in which judges who possess the most merit, 
as measured empirically, would be selected over their lower-ranked 
peers. If their tournament were seriously adopted, promotions to the 
U.S. Supreme Court would be based on quantitative measures of, 
rather than qualitative claims to, merit.  
 When Choi and Gulati first circulated their proposal, many legal 
scholars (including us) believed it a clever experiment of Swiftian 
proportions. Choi and Gulati are more than witty provocateurs. They 
are also hard-working, smart, and careful scholars. Since proposing 
the tournament, Choi and Gulati have collected and analyzed em-
pirical data on federal appellate court judges, ranking every sitting 
appellate court judge over their test period.8 The federal judiciary is 
not yet setting salaries based on their tournament ranking, but their 
effort to operationalize and measure the performance of judges is se-
rious business. Not only would we choose the next Supreme Court 
Justice from among their tournament’s high performers if Choi and 
Gulati’s understanding of merit were the standard, but they have 
done the heavy lifting for the next President to propose a nomination 
to the Supreme Court, actually conducting their tournament by rank-
ing sitting appellate court judges based on measures of their produc-
tivity, influence, and independence.  
 Inspired by the burgeoning empirical literature on the judiciary, 
as well as Choi and Gulati’s proposal that empirical study (including 
a tournament) be used in judicial selection, the editors of the Florida 
State University Law Review have given Choi and Gulati a little 
company on the court by soliciting some essays addressing the topic 
of empirical measures of judicial performance from leading scholars 
as well as some federal judges who, willingly or not, played in their 
tournament. The essays in this Symposium address empirical meas-
ures of judicial performance from a variety of methodological per-
spectives, but they can roughly be organized around three basic 
themes. First, many of the essays critique the empirical enterprise 
itself and especially the tournament strategy for evaluating judges, 
although these essays also raise important issues for future empiri-
cal study of judges. Second, many of the essays in the Symposium 
propose new ways of operationalizing the empirical study of judicial 
performance or present fresh empirical evidence about judges and 
courts. Third, some of the essays focus on the behavioral and institu-
tional implications of empirical studies on judges and courts.  
                                                                                                                     
 8. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An 
Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004) (applying the tour-
nament idea to data on federal appellate court judges). 
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I.   CONCEPTUAL CRITIQUES OF THE JUDICIAL TOURNAMENT: CAN WE 
MEASURE JUDGES, AND IF SO, HOW? 
 It is certainly not new to claim that quality in judging is incapable 
of empirical measurement. Judge Harry Edwards of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit is perhaps the strongest critic of efforts 
to quantitatively measure the activities of judges and courts. For ex-
ample, in a much-cited article on attempts to use quantitative tech-
niques to study the judiciary, he observes that quantitative studies of 
judicial decisions “must be viewed with great caution.”9 He further 
states, “Regression analysis does not do well in capturing the nu-
ances of human personalities and relationships, so empirical studies 
on judicial decision making that rely solely on this tool are inherently 
flawed.”10  
 Many of the essays in this Symposium echo Judge Edwards’ skep-
ticism toward quantitative studies of the judiciary. The essays add 
several fresh perspectives and concerns to the mix of critics of quanti-
tative measures of judicial performance. Some of the essays raise a 
concern with quantitative measures of what is fundamentally quali-
tative, as did Judge Edwards. For instance, one concern that rever-
berates throughout the various criticisms of Choi and Gulati’s tour-
nament is that it interferes with judicial independence. Other con-
cerns relate to the imperfections of various quantitative measures of 
judicial performance, suggesting that we look to different criteria 
than Choi and Gulati’s. In addition, some reject the extension of 
ranking or quantification of any sort to individual judges and judicial 
institutions. 
 Brannon Denning expresses some skepticism about an empirical 
judicial appointments tournament by challenging some of the as-
sumptions underlying Choi and Gulati’s proposal.11 In particular, 
Denning questions the assumption that politics has overwhelmed the 
judicial selection process. Denning first argues that Choi and Gulati 
have not carefully defined the “politics” with which they are con-
cerned. Denning argues that when Choi and Gulati refer to “politics,” 
what they really mean is “ideology.” Denning then critiques the claim 
that ideology should not enter the judicial appointments process. 
Denning suggests that the problem (if it is a problem) with the intro-
duction of ideology into the process lies not with the President and 
individual Senators, but with the constituents they represent. If 
                                                                                                                     
 9. Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1639, 1656 (2003).  
 10. Id.; see also Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Cir-
cuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1998). 
 11. Brannon P. Denning, Empirical Measures of Judicial Performance: Thoughts on 
Choi and Gulati’s Tournament of Judges, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1123 (2005). 
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members of the public view judging as at least in part an ideological 
process, Denning asks, then why should an appointee’s ideology be 
excluded from the range of concerns discussed during the confirma-
tion process? After posing this question, Denning moves on to praise 
Choi and Gulati for providing one possible model of a more sophisti-
cated framework for critiquing nominees during the judicial selection 
process. Denning concludes that something like the Choi and Gulati 
system could improve both the process itself and the public’s under-
standing of that process. 
 Steven Goldberg’s essay, Federal Judges and the Heisman Tro-
phy,12 challenges Choi and Gulati’s basic premise that lower federal 
courts are the most logical places to identify candidates with the 
proper qualifications to be great Supreme Court Justices. Goldberg 
points out that most of the individuals who have become Supreme 
Court Justices did not serve on lower federal courts. They came, in-
stead, from the state courts, the executive or legislative branches of 
government, or private practice. Even more striking, Goldberg sur-
veys eleven lists of highly successful Justices and finds that the Jus-
tices who served on lower federal courts fared very badly on those 
lists. Only one of the twenty-three Justices who appear on two or 
more of those eleven lists had previously served on a lower federal 
court. Goldberg concludes by drawing an analogy between Choi and 
Gulati’s tournament of judges and other flawed efforts to predict 
greatness in other fields. In particular, Goldberg notes the failure of 
most Heisman Trophy winners to succeed in professional football. 
Goldberg suggests that success at the lower levels of the federal 
courts may require different talents than success at the highest judi-
cial level, just as success in college football may require different tal-
ents than success at the professional level. Goldberg leaves open the 
possibility that the talents required to succeed at the highest judicial 
level can be empirically assessed but concludes that Choi and Gu-
lati’s tournament is unlikely to predict greatness in Supreme Court 
Justices. 
 John Orth’s essay looks to history as a reminder that judges have 
been judged as long as we have had courts.13 Of course, elite and lay 
public opinion frequently is directed toward judicial decisions as well 
as individual judges. Many states directly elect judges, a relic of the 
Jacksonian Era. Litigants, too, frequently cast judgment on the judges 
before whom they have appeared. In addition, the political process 
may serve to critique judges through the process of impeachment and 
other removals. Despite these many institutionalized mechanisms for 
                                                                                                                     
 12. Steven Goldberg, Federal Judges and the Heisman Trophy, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1237 (2005). 
 13. John V. Orth, Who Judges the Judges?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1245 (2005). 
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evaluating judges, Orth is reluctant to embrace efforts to measure 
judicial performance empirically as a basis for judicial selection and 
promotions. To the extent that most empirical metrics focus on the 
outcome of courts—the decision rather than the opinion—Orth ar-
gues that empirical studies fail to capture important aspects of the 
judicial process and function. Moreover, Orth argues that many em-
pirical measures of influence, such as citation studies, rely primarily 
on judicial peers to judge performance, thus threatening the constitu-
tional balance of powers by promoting consensus candidates, at the 
cost of political judgment by other branches.  
 Lawrence Solum, who was one of the first in print to criticize Choi 
and Gulati’s tournament idea,14 poses a serious conceptual challenge 
to any empirical tournament of judges.15 As he suggests, by beginning 
with the available data rather than a concept of judicial excellence, 
Choi and Gulati beg a fundamental question: What is judicial excel-
lence? Solum begins his project with virtue rather than measures of 
virtue. Solum identifies the “thin” judicial virtues—those on which 
there is widespread agreement—as extending much broader than 
Choi and Gulati’s measures. These virtues include incorruptibility 
and judicial sobriety, civic courage, judicial temperament and impar-
tiality, diligence and carefulness, judicial intelligence and learned-
ness, and craft and skill. In addition, Solum makes a plea for recogni-
tion of “thick” judicial virtues: nomimos (roughly, the virtue of jus-
tice) and phronimos (roughly, judicial wisdom). If, as Solum suggests, 
these virtues in the practice of judging are what constitute excel-
lence, then, clearly, it cannot be measured empirically. Solum further 
observes that to the extent Choi and Gulati measure something less 
than excellence, he sees many opportunities for gaming this already 
imperfect measure. Solum argues that the tournament fails to pro-
duce accurate and meaningful statistics, let alone a useful and le-
gitimate process of judicial selection based on excellence. Neverthe-
less, he sees the judicial tournament as a useful thought experiment 
to the extent that it asks valuable questions about both the content of 
judicial excellence and the selection of judges who possess it.  
 David Vladeck brings a litigator’s perspective to bear to the critique 
of an empirical tournament as a measurement of judicial performance.16 
Vladeck shares Choi and Gulati’s distaste for a political judicial ap-
pointments process and litmus tests as a basis for judicial selection, 
suggesting that litigators look for competent judges who value collegial-
                                                                                                                     
 14. See Lawrence B. Solum, A Tournament for Judges. Mad? Brilliant? 
Clever?, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Apr. 17, 2004), at http://lsolum.blogspot.com/archives/ 
2003_04_01_lsolum_archive.html#200162580. 
 15. Lawrence B. Solum, A Tournament of Virtue, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1365 (2005). 
 16. David C. Vladeck, Keeping Score: The Utility of Empirical Measurements in Judi-
cial Selection, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1415 (2005). 
2005]              AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM 1007 
 
ity and efficiency in dispute resolution. Most litigators would rather be 
spared the “inept, plodding, or even mediocre”17 judges, even if those 
judges are seen as the champions of important political values. Vladeck 
is wary of efforts to attribute objectivity and quantitative measurement 
to the judicial attributes that litigators value. For example, he observes 
that focus on the product of the judicial decision fails to capture much of 
the collaborative process of judging. Yet he does see some modest prom-
ise to the enterprise of empirical measurement of judges as delimiting a 
baseline for determining judicial competence in judicial selection. 
Vladeck would broaden Choi and Gulati’s factors to include many ques-
tions relating to the experience of a potential nominee in practice, gov-
ernment, and the community. He would see the absence of empirical 
performance on the relevant criteria as a danger signal, but superior 
performance on one or more criterion should not necessarily be a deter-
minative factor in influencing judicial selection. 
II.   NEW EMPIRICAL WORK ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE: HOW DO WE 
OPERATIONALIZE AND MEASURE IT? 
 Choi and Gulati’s study poses many new questions as to how we 
should best measure variables empirically. Several of the essays in 
this Symposium refine the operationalization of the criteria Choi and 
Gulati put forth. Others attempt new measurements of judicial per-
formance or put Choi and Gulati’s criteria to a reality test against the 
data. These essays add important knowledge to the body of empirical 
scholarship on courts and judges. 
 James Brudney starts his essay with an assessment of how effec-
tively Choi and Gulati’s proposed tournament would have predicted 
the careers of two Supreme Court nominees from an earlier era.18 
Brudney applies the Choi and Gulati analysis to the appointments of 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. Brudney concludes that 
the Choi and Gulati analysis would have produced inaccurate predic-
tions about their Supreme Court careers. Under the Choi and Gulati 
analysis, Chief Justice Burger should have done very well on the Su-
preme Court. According to the Choi and Gulati criteria, Burger 
scored favorably on productivity and independence measures while 
serving as a court of appeals judge, while Justice Blackmun scored 
markedly lower in both areas. In contrast to this prediction, Burger 
is widely viewed as a poor Chief Justice, while Blackmun is equally 
widely viewed as relatively distinguished. Brudney concludes that 
Choi and Gulati’s criteria fail to measure intangible personal factors 
that contribute to greatness in Supreme Court Justices—such as the 
                                                                                                                     
 17. Id. at 1416. 
 18. James J. Brudney, Foreseeing Greatness? Measurable Performance Criteria and 
the Selection of Supreme Court Justices, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1015 (2005). 
1008  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1001 
 
arrogance and aloofness that characterized Chief Justice Burger’s 
tenure on the Court and the ability to change and grow that charac-
terized Justice Blackmun’s Supreme Court career. Brudney also 
draws the broader conclusion that Choi and Gulati’s system unwisely 
attempts to remove policy and ideological considerations from the ju-
dicial selection process. Brudney notes that many observers (and 
members of the general public) view these factors as highly signifi-
cant, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s important role in 
shaping the basic collective values of the American political system. 
 Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati continue their effort to devise ob-
jective measures of quality and judicial merit in their contribution, 
Which Judges Write Their Opinions (And Should We Care)?.19 They 
use techniques from computational linguistics and other methods to 
explore both the desirability and feasibility of determining whether 
individual judges write their own judicial opinions. In the first part of 
their essay, Choi and Gulati argue that knowing the authorship of 
judicial opinions is highly relevant when deciding whether to elevate 
a judge to a higher court. They also argue that this information will 
be useful in assessing the ongoing performance of sitting judges and 
in making determinations about the allocation of judicial resources. 
Assuming this information is useful, Choi and Gulati attempt to de-
vise a method to assess judicial authorship. Unfortunately, the meth-
odology chosen by Choi and Gulati failed to identify judges who, by 
reputation, are known to write their own opinions. Choi and Gulati 
speculate on the failure of this methodology and suggest possibilities 
for future research using a more finely honed version of the method-
ology, which would control for opinions regarding different subject 
matter and would focus on factors such as citation practices; opinion, 
paragraph, and sentence length; and other, frequency-related meas-
ures. 
 Sharing Brudney’s views, Lee Epstein, Jeffrey Segal, Nancy 
Staudt, and René Lindstädt are skeptical about the broad assump-
tions about the judicial nomination process that motivate Choi and 
Gulati’s proposed tournament of judges.20 Specifically, these four au-
thors dispute the conclusion that policy determinations and ideologi-
cal concerns have come to dominate the process of judicial nomina-
tion and confirmation. They base this claim on their comprehensive 
study of all votes cast by individual Senators on Supreme Court 
nominees since Earl Warren in 1953. Their study indicates that al-
though ideology plays a significant role in determining whether a 
                                                                                                                     
 19. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Which Judges Write Their Opinions (And 
Should We Care)?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1077 (2005). 
 20. Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, Nancy Staudt & René Lindstädt, The Role of Quali-
fications in the Confirmation of Nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1145 (2005). 
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Senator will vote for or against a nominee, the qualifications of the 
nominee will play virtually the same role. It is the interplay of these 
two factors—ideology and qualifications—that provides the best pre-
dictor of a Senator’s vote. While Senators will almost certainly vote 
for a nominee whose ideology is similar and who is highly qualified 
and will almost certainly vote against a nominee who is ideologically 
dissimilar and unqualified, there are certain conditions in which 
Senators will often vote for an ideologically dissimilar nominee who 
is highly qualified. The authors conclude that despite common com-
plaints about the nomination system, the qualifications of a nominee 
continue to play a significant role in the confirmation process. The 
authors argue that this conclusion should give pause to those—
including Choi and Gulati—who propose to fundamentally alter the 
current judicial selection process. 
 Daniel Farber starts his essay, Supreme Court Selection and 
Measures of Past Judicial Performance,21 by praising Choi and Gu-
lati’s contribution to the judicial selection literature. Farber specifi-
cally compliments them for showing how objective measures of past 
judicial performance could improve the judicial selection process. He 
then suggests, however, that Choi and Gulati’s proposals are far too 
ambitious based on the evidence they have mustered. Farber argues 
that we should be reluctant to adopt their proposal because it is im-
possible to measure past judicial performance as precisely as they 
claim and because professional merit should not be the only factor in 
the judicial selection process. With regard to the first point, Farber 
notes that some of the criteria used by Choi and Gulati to measure 
productivity and independence are imperfect because high scores on 
these criteria may be a function of a judge’s personal characteristics 
(such as self-centeredness) that would not well serve a Supreme 
Court Justice. Other measures, such as the use of citation counts as a 
proxy for influence, are imperfect because of outlier effects and feed-
back loops that generate citations primarily due to a judge’s personal 
prominence, which may or may not be directly correlated with objec-
tive merit. In the end, Farber engages Choi and Gulati on their own 
terms more than most of the commentators—to the extent their tour-
nament provides at least a rough measure of judicial merit—but he 
also argues that merit alone should not be (and probably will never 
be) the deciding factor in judicial selection. 
 Michael Gerhardt’s essay surveys the problems with defining 
three critical factors that are often central to the judicial selection 
                                                                                                                     
 21. Daniel A. Farber, Supreme Court Selection and Measures of Past Judicial Per-
formance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1175 (2005). 
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process: merit, the “mainstream,” and ideology.22 In the first part of 
his essay, Gerhardt documents the different ways in which merit is 
defined by different constituencies and discusses the assumptions 
about the judicial role that underlie these different definitions. The 
second part of Gerhardt’s essay investigates the effort to define the 
“mainstream” in battles over judicial appointments. Although the 
fight over the “mainstream” is common to almost all judicial ap-
pointments battles, it is unclear how this middle ground should be 
defined. Gerhardt provides several options and considers the various 
perspectives from which the middle ground should be viewed. The 
third part of his essay assesses the ways in which the effects of ideol-
ogy can be assessed in judicial appointments battles. Despite the dif-
ficulties presented by these three aspects of the judicial appoint-
ments process, Gerhardt argues that an objective empirical study of 
merit is both possible and desirable. In the absence of some mecha-
nism to assess judicial appointments by reference to a coherent and 
comprehensive definition of merit, Gerhardt concludes, judges will be 
viewed as little more than “policymakers who just happen to wear 
robes.”23 
 Michael Solimine’s contribution, Judicial Stratification and the 
Reputations of the United States Courts of Appeals,24 advances the 
empirical project by applying the tournament concept to performance 
across, rather than within, appellate courts. Like many of the other 
contributions, Solimine disentangles the concepts of reputation, pres-
tige, and influence in hopes of identifying a dependable measure of 
quality. Insofar as the subject of empirical inquiry is federal appel-
late court judges, he suggests that an effort to separate empirical 
study of the performance of judges from the performance of the courts 
they compose is useful. After surveying historical efforts to measure 
the reputations of courts of appeals, in which the D.C. Circuit and 
Second Circuit seem to consistently enjoy the highest reputation and 
most influence, Solimine considers how studies of the citation analy-
sis of particular appellate court judges relate to the reputation of the 
circuit on which they sit. Some of the measures of influence, Solimine 
observes, place the Seventh Circuit above the D.C. Circuit and Sec-
ond Circuit. Solimine’s analysis of the rise and fall of reputation 
sheds light on the nature and importance of reputation of appellate 
courts generally. For instance, he observes that during the latter part 
of the twentieth century, reputation among circuits became homoge-
nized and the importance of reputation fell among litigants. 
                                                                                                                     
 22. Michael J. Gerhardt, Judicial Selection by the Numbers, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1197 (2005). 
 23. Id. at 1235. 
 24. Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Stratification and the Reputations of the United 
States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1331 (2005). 
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Solimine’s analysis also illuminates disconnects in reputation be-
tween appellate circuits.  
III.   DO MEASURES OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE CREATE POSITIVE 
BEHAVIORAL AND INSTITUTIONAL INCENTIVES? 
 Regardless of whether and how we measure judicial performance, 
everyone agrees that the empirical enterprise has important implica-
tions for behavioral incentives and institutions. If we measure—and 
especially if we rank or otherwise evaluate—actors in an institutional 
setting based on their performance on a set of criteria, these actors 
will adjust their conduct in response to the positive and negative in-
centives created by this information. This seems uncontroversial in 
concept. But any evaluation of judicial incentives requires some 
specification of the motivations of judges. In a famous article, Judge 
Richard Posner suggested that judges maximize “the same thing eve-
rybody else does,”25 but among (most) lawyers and judges, it remains 
controversial to claim that judges are motivated by anything other 
than doing justice. For political scientists, economists, and some legal 
scholars, discussion of incentives affecting judicial behavior is much 
less maligned. Several of the essays make important behavioral and 
institutional insights which will have implications for further empiri-
cal and conceptual research on judges and courts. 
 Judge Jay Bybee and Thomas Miles join other commentators in 
questioning Choi and Gulati’s central argument that an empirical 
tournament can settle disputes over the qualifications of candidates 
for judicial appointments.26 While acknowledging that empirical as-
sessments are an important factor in the appointments process, By-
bee and Miles argue that other, less quantifiable subjective measures 
of quality are even more significant. For example, they suggest that 
an analysis of a candidate’s position on “hot-button” issues such as 
affirmative action and abortion can often reveal more about a candi-
date’s qualifications than the empirical measures suggested by Choi 
and Gulati. Also, Bybee and Miles observe that the tournament 
would create strong incentives for ambitious judges to engage in un-
desirable behavior simply to increase their judicial score. Ambitious 
judges will be encouraged to “judge to the tournament,”27 which will 
have the effect of undermining the spirit of judicial independence and 
pursuit of judicial quality that the tournament is supposed to en-
courage. 
                                                                                                                     
 25. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing 
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993). 
 26. Hon. Jay S. Bybee & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Tournament, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1055 (2005). 
 27. Id. at 1068-73. 
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 Judge Richard Posner’s contribution to the issue, Judicial Behav-
ior and Performance: An Economic Approach,28 should be taken very 
seriously by both judges and scholars—and not only because Posner 
is the likely victor in Choi and Gulati’s tournament of appellate 
judges. As is characteristic of Posner’s work, the contribution is 
brimming with valuable insights about the implications of empirical 
measures of individual performance of judges. Posner challenges em-
pirical and behavioral scholars of the judiciary to start with a more 
serious institutional framework for understanding decisions rather 
than simply with data. As Posner’s approach would suggest, “judicial 
behavior is likely to differ across national legal systems and indeed 
within a nation’s legal systems to the extent that components of the 
system . . . differ in the incentives and constraints that they impose 
on judges.”29 He extends the analysis not only to appellate court 
judges—for which he, like Brudney, would like to see greater histori-
cal research of how a judge’s performance on the U.S. court of ap-
peals maps onto performance as a Justice of the U.S. Supreme 
Court—but also to the different institutional settings of U.S. district 
court judges, state court judges, and arbitrators. Posner illuminates 
how each of the institutional settings presents unique behavioral in-
centives for individual judges. His analysis of behavioral incentives 
in the institutional context raises many additional questions and hy-
potheses for empirical research not only of the behavior of judges but 
also of other actors within the judicial system. 
 Judge Bruce Selya evaluates the dual objective of the tournament: 
merit-based evaluation and increased incentive to perform.30 The pro-
liferation of multiple objective metrics may undermine the goal of po-
litical transparency: he suggests that “any ranking system will face 
constant criticism that it is a proxy for either political affiliation or 
ideological leanings rather than for merit.”31 As to Choi and Gulati’s 
criteria, Judge Selya takes issue with several of them—particularly 
their incentive effects. Commenting on the manipulability of citation 
measures, he suggests that “[a]ny judge worth his salt will tell you 
that there are ways to write opinions that make citation more 
likely.”32 He also characterizes the measurement of judicial inde-
pendence by use of dissents as useless as well as perverse in its in-
centives. Selya points out that, over time, “judicial rankings will say 
less about actual merit and more about agility—the ability to game 
                                                                                                                     
 28. Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 
32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1259 (2005). 
 29. Id. at 1259. 
 30. Hon. Bruce M. Selya, Pulling from the Ranks?: Remarks on the Proposed Use of an 
Objective Judicial Ranking System to Guide the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 32 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1281 (2005). 
 31. Id. at 1286. 
 32. Id. at 1290. 
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the system.”33 The inevitable result of these incentives, Judge Selya 
warns, is to undermine the very goals of the tournament. 
 Russell Smyth’s essay illustrates the promise of taking seriously 
the institutional context of judging.34 Smyth rejects the suggestion of 
Judge Harry Edwards35 that the collegiality of judging cannot be 
measured, suggesting that “there is much evidence of the success of 
regression analysis in capturing these nuances of human behavior.”36 
Smyth examines how the idea of the judicial tournament would 
translate in the setting of judicial selection in Australia. He carefully 
builds from an evaluation of judicial incentives, pointing out both be-
havioral and quantitative problems with many of the Choi and Gulati 
criteria along the way. Smyth argues that a tournament transplanted 
to the Antipodes would best focus on minimum qualifications for 
judges, rather than on the highfliers. His essay illustrates how one 
need not reject empirical study of judges in order to accept the criti-
cisms of the judicial tournament many others make.37  
 Ahmed Taha’s essay provides a limited defense of an empirical ju-
dicial tournament.38 Taha focuses on the effects of rankings on the 
judicial nomination and confirmation process as well as the effects of 
rankings on judges’ behaviors. He argues that the case for a tourna-
ment of judges as a judicial selection device is stronger for the posi-
tions to which Choi and Gulati apply the tournament—U.S. courts of 
appeals—than for positions on the U.S. Supreme Court. As he ar-
gues, basing selection of U.S. Supreme Court Justices on a tourna-
ment may undermine Choi and Gulati’s goals by allowing “a Presi-
dent to nominate more politically extreme candidates who happen to 
have high merit rankings.”39 By contrast, “a ranking of federal dis-
trict [court] judges would avoid many of the problems that might be 
created by ranking appellate judges.”40 Further, based on an assess-
ment of judicial behavior, he suggests that, if subjected to the tour-
nament, federal district judges are more likely to respond to the posi-
tive incentives it creates. 
                                                                                                                     
 33. Id. at 1294-95. 
 34. Russell Smyth, Do Judges Behave as Homo Economicus, and if So, Can We Meas-
ure Their Performance? An Antipodean Perspective on a Tournament of Judges, 32 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 1299 (2005). 
 35. Edwards, supra note 9, at 1640-43, 1656. 
 36. Smyth, supra note 34, at 1319-20. 
 37. See supra Part I. 
 38. Ahmed E. Taha, Information and the Selection of Judges: A Comment on “A Tour-
nament of Judges,” 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1401 (2005). 
 39. Id. at 1406. 
 40. Id. at 1403. 
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IV.   CONCLUSION 
 There is an elegance about the empirical tournament as a mecha-
nism for making the intangible knowable and defusing political 
rhetoric in judicial selection. Of course, it does not succeed in these 
respects. As the essays in this Symposium suggest, the project of em-
pirical evaluation of judicial performance must also address norma-
tive questions of quality, and it raises important issues about meas-
urement, behaviors, and incentives. A focus on empirical issues relat-
ing to the activity of judging and its outputs not only feeds the pruri-
ence of the legal community for gossip about what lies beneath the 
robes of judges, but it can help to shed light on fundamental issues of 
judicial behavior, important to students and scholars in law, political 
science, and economics. It also challenges scholars to disentangle im-
portant questions relating to the quality of judging and judicial insti-
tutions. For example, to what extent can judicial performance be re-
duced to a judge’s reputation? Or does quality in judging represent 
something more? To what extent, if any, does judicial quality in one 
institutional setting, such as in the context of the U.S. circuit courts 
of appeals, necessarily translate into quality in another judicial set-
ting, such as in the context of the U.S. Supreme Court? Does a Su-
preme Court nomination system that keeps Judge Posner from be-
coming Justice Posner really fail to recognize or reward merit?  
 Choi and Gulati’s empirical tournament presents a much-
welcomed challenge: How might we introduce greater objectivity into 
discussions of merit in judicial selection? The scholarly ruminations 
in the pages of this Symposium certainly cannot answer all of the 
questions empirical studies of judging and courts present. Much as 
the initial furor the tournament provoked, some of the commentators 
in this Symposium refuse Choi and Gulati’s challenge on normative 
terms. Nevertheless, as the Symposium contributions clearly indi-
cate, an empirical tournament tells us much about several enter-
prises: normative theories of judging, quality, judicial independence, 
and judicial selection; empirical discussions of measurement of 
judges and courts; and behavioral and incentive-based evaluations of 
institutions. As the essays in the Symposium indicate, the empirical 
tournament has inspired some important advances in the discourse 
about measurement of performance in the context of the judiciary 
and its relevance to the selection of judges and the judicial process. 
That is a discourse that will be certain to continue as long as we have 
data, judges, and courts. 
 
